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The Problem of Governance in China 
Joseph Fewsmith  
Boston University 
Resumen 
El artículo nos aproxima a la esfera pública en China a través 
del ámbito del comercio, que es un espacio clave en la 
emergencia de la sociedad civil. El autor analiza el surgimiento 
de la esfera pública y la sociedad civil en China desde finales 
de la dinastía Qing hasta la actualidad. Por lo que se refiere a la 
contemporaneidad, el artículo examina el desarrollo de las 
cámaras de comercio en Wenzhou, un lugar donde la actividad 
asociativa y el desarrollo de la economía privada han tenido un 
papel predominante en China. Finalmente el artículo analiza 
hasta qué punto y qué tipo de institucionalización se está 
desarrollando en China.  
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Abstract 
The paper discusses the public sphere in China by looking at 
the commercial area, which is a key area in the emergence of 
civil society. To do that, the paper highlights the situation of 
public sphere and civil society from the late Qing to the 
present. Regarding the contemporaneity, the paper analyzes the 
development over the past few years of chambers of commerce 
in Wenzhou, where associational activity, like the development 
of the private economy, has gone well beyond other places in 
China. Finally the paper reflects on the notion of 
institutionalization by focusing on what type and how much 
institutionalization is taking place in contemporary China.  
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THE PROBLEM OF GOVERNANCE IN 
CHINA1  
Joseph Fewsmith  
Boston University 
 
There are many different dimensions to governance –elite 
politics, the provision of public services, the incorporation or 
non-incorporation of societal interests, etcetera.– but the way I 
think of governance issues is essentially the way power is or is 
not constrained at various levels. Of course, the way power is 
or is not constrained is directly related to institutionalization on 
the one hand and the way societal interests are able to be 
expressed on the other. Interestingly, the way power is or is not 
constrained at one level is quite related to the way it is or is not 
constrained at another level. The two levels that most interest 
me are elite politics and that space between state and society 
that is usually known as the “public sphere”. In this paper, 
however, I only have space to discuss the public sphere, and I 
will do so primarily by looking at the commercial area, which 
is the area in which one might expect the emergence of civil 
society because this area is the least threatening to the state. 
And I would like to do so by looking not just at contemporary 
China, but at the public sphere from the late Qing to the 
present. 
 
                                                 
1 Publication of this paper has been authorised by CIDOB-Barcelona Centre 
for International Affairs. 
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Introduction 
In modern Chinese history, the emergence of the public sphere 
might be traced back to the elite activism that Mary Rankin 
(1986) has studied so well. In post-Taiping Zhejiang province, 
local elites were made up of a combination of traditional gentry 
and the emergent merchant class, and there was less and less 
distinction between these two groups over time. These elites 
undertook a wide range of activities, including reconstruction 
efforts, philanthropic activities, and educational activities that 
exceeded the bounds that China’s traditional elites had played.  
Given the weakness of the late Qing state, local elites took on a 
public role that eventually challenged the authority of the state.  
Rankin argues that the rise of the press helped mobilize public 
opinion in the late 19th century and provide a critical voice for 
local elites that eventually undermined the legitimacy of the 
Qing. Nationalism provided an ideological focus for this 
emerging critical voice. The issue that eventually mobilized this 
local elite in opposition to the state was the decision of a newly 
activist state –under the New Policies of the late Qing– to 
borrow money from Britain to build a railroad in Zhejiang. The 
effort to extend the power of the central state clashed with the 
mobilized opinion of local society and eventually undermined 
the legitimacy of the Qing state. This demonstration of the 
power of the emergent public sphere, however, did not lead to a 
new, vigorous associational life that might have reshaped state-
society relations along pluralist lines. This was in part because 
the organization of local elites in Zhejiang had taken place 
under a state structure that made autonomous organization 
illegal. The result was that local organizations never had the 
legitimacy that might have led China along a more liberal 
democratic path (Rankin, 1986: 25, 263-298, 306-307). 
Up the coast a bit, elite activism, including associational 
activity, was thriving in Shanghai. The presence of foreign 
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concessions, while an assault on Chinese sovereignty, brought 
new ideas and new models of governance, while the crumbling 
of state authority brought freedom from higher levels of 
Chinese officials who would stifle autonomous organizations. 
This combination of forces brought at least two developments 
worth remembering. One was the formation of the Shanghai 
General Chamber of Commerce in 1903. The chamber of 
commerce brought together the leading merchants of the city as 
they began to articulate their own interests as merchants and as 
citizens. Like chambers of commerce elsewhere, the Shanghai 
General Chamber of Commerce formed a merchant militia to 
help preserve social order in the city. Eventually this merchant 
militia expressed the political leanings of the members when it 
joined the republican forces in the Revolution of 1911. 
The other was the formation of the Shanghai City Council in 
1905 in Nanshi. This was perhaps the most democratic 
government to appear on mainland Chinese soil to this day. 
Councilors were elected, and they debated the issues of the day 
on a basis of equality. The Chinese administered part of 
Shanghai was autonomous from higher levels of administrative 
authority (Elvin, 1969: 41-665). 
This flurry of governmental self-organization and associational 
activity slowed in the wake of the failure of the Second 
Revolution. Yuan Shikai moved to consolidate his power by 
ending the autonomy of the Shanghai City Council and by 
eliminating the merchant militia in 1914. These efforts to curb 
the emergence of societal interests ended, at least for a while, 
with Yuan Shikai’s death and the descent into warlordism, 
though the Shanghai City Council never reopened.  
The Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce flourished in the 
warlord period, but the absence of effective state authority 
limited its usefulness. The chamber tried to organize 
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discussions among competing warlords to end the constant 
warfare, but the chamber hardly had the influence to achieve 
such an ambitious goal. It also lobbied for tariff autonomy, but 
the absence of state power made such appeals ineffective. It 
supported the election of Chinese to the British dominated city 
council in the International Settlement, though, again, it was 
unable to achieve its goal. And its members, while hardly 
populists, were nationalists, supporting the May Fourth 
Movement in 1919 and the May Thirtieth Movement in 1925. 
And, of course, the chamber, or at least several of its leading 
members, supported the Nationalist Revolution that brought 
Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Party to power. Labor 
unions also grew up in this period, particularly in the wake of 
the May Fourth Movement, and, of course, they were the 
leading force in the May 30th Movement.  
The re-emergence of effective state power, at least in the lower 
Yangzi valley, however, curbed this growing associational 
activity. The Nationalist Government promulgated a set of laws 
that articulated a corporatist framework for organizing state-
society relations. Fundamentally these laws, and much of 
Nationalist Government policy, were demobilizing, intended 
not to provide channels for interest articulation but to stop the 
organized expression of interests. This was especially true of 
labor unions, but it applies to merchants associations as well. 
Private interests could still be expressed privately, of course, 
but the private expression of interests could not solve the larger 
problem of governance. Associations, whether of merchants or 
workers, could hardly constrain political power. And 
government policy seemed to view autonomous associations as 
threats to the exercise of political power. If they could not be 
suppressed altogether, they could at least be organized into 
state dominated, and largely ineffective, channels that, among 
other things, took up organizational space and prevented the 
emergence of other associations. 
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It is of more than passing interest to inquire as to why civil 
society did not emerge in this era. Perhaps the simplest and 
most direct answer is that the Nationalist movement was a 
revolutionary movement, and like most revolutionary 
movements it had a solipsistic ideology that recognized no 
legitimate curbs to its authority. The constitutional framework 
it established, as Nathan has shown, was full of qualifications 
that really did not limit the authority of the State (Nathan, 
1985). But it is also true that society was weak. Shanghai may 
have been a bourgeois city, but China was not a bourgeois 
country. The result was that society could work with the state, 
but it could not resist the state. 
If the Nationalist era was characterized by a state corporatist 
framework, the PRC implemented a Leninist monistic system 
in which chambers of commerce, quickly redubbed Federations 
of Industry and Commerce (gongshanglian), became the 
“transmission belts” forwarding the latest policies of the 
party/state, just as the Women’s Federation and the All-China 
Federation of Labor Unions did in their respective areas of 
society. In fact, the Gongshanglian were in even worse shape 
than the Federation of Labor Unions and Women’s 
Associations, for the task of the Gongshanglian was to 
eliminate the class that it presumably represented. Not only 
could civil society not appear in this period, even minjian 
shehui (usually translated “folk society”) survived only with 
great difficulty. 
After reforms began in 1978, minjian shehui began to re-
emerge quickly. Even the “transmission belt” United Front 
organizations began to articulate at least some of the interests 
of their constituents. In the area of chambers of commerce, in 
1988 the re-established gongshanglian began to write “chamber 
of commerce” on the other side of their signboards. Then, it 
was actually the gongshanglian, in search of members to 
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govern, that began to organize subordinate chambers of 
commerce. In other words, the initial effort was a top-down 
effort to organize an already emergent minjian shehui. 
Chambers of commerce were rather heavy handed, bureaucratic 
organizations that had little in common with either minjian 
shehui or civil society, and in many places they remain that 
way. They also adopted a corporatist framework –one 
association, one trade, one administrative division– that had the 
affect of blocking the rise of associations that could actually 
articulate the interest of their members –such organizations 
exist, but they do so only informally. 
I have begun looking at the development of chambers of 
commerce in Wenzhou, where associational activity, like the 
development of the private economy, has gone well beyond 
other places in China. In other words, if there is any place in 
China where one might expect to see civil society develop, it 
would be Wenzhou. Of course, Wenzhou has many special 
characteristics, including its history, dialect, and unique local 
culture, so it is not clear that its experience could be replicated 
elsewhere. Still, it suggests a sort of outer limit to the 
development of civil society and is therefore worth exploring as 
a test case. 
It is interesting that chambers of commerce did not develop in 
Wenzhou as a natural outgrowth of the private economy. On 
the contrary, as in other places in China, they were brought into 
being through government effort. When the Gongshanglian 
was established in Wenzhou, it needed to have chambers of 
commerce to justify its own existence. This was an 
organizational  need, not a societal demand.  
Perhaps the most interesting example of the formation of an 
early trade association is that of the Lucheng District Shoe 
Industry Association –Lucheng being a district in Wenzhou–. 
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In 1987 5.000 Wenzhou-made shoes were burned in protest 
against their poor quality. But this was not a civil disturbance; 
it was the Lucheng District Government itself that carried out 
this “protest”. And it was not the shoe industry that took the 
lead in organizing in response but rather the Lucheng District 
government that organized the Lucheng District Shoe Industry 
Association. The district government, in consultation with 
industry representatives, drew up a set of industry standards 
and, in good corporatist fashion, ordered that all shoe producers 
to join the new association. The association was given 
enforcement functions, but it was clearly government standards 
that were being enforced on behalf of the government. This was 
an effort that supported the interests of the local shoe 
manufacturing industry, particularly the larger manufacturers, 
but it nevertheless was inaugurated from the top. 
Even two decades later, the relationship between the Lucheng 
District Shoe Association and the local government remains 
very close. The requirement for all shoe producers to join the 
association has been dropped and many of the smaller 
manufacturers have dropped out of the association –to avoid 
paying dues–, though they are still required to follow the 
association’s rules with regards to standards and after-sales 
service.  
Despite the early appearance of the Lucheng District Shoe 
Industry Association and a few others, it was only after Deng 
Xiaoping’s “Southern sojourn”, which was heartily applauded 
in Wenzhou, that large numbers of chambers of commerce and 
industry associations were organized, suggesting again the 
importance of politics in the organization of society. Although 
the state again took the lead, at least many of these associations 
reflected their members’ needs and interests. Unlike in most 
places in China, the Wenzhou government does not allocate 
funds for such associations; they are self-supporting through 
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membership fees, training, and associational activities such as 
industrial expositions. They may remain under the supervision 
of the government, but they elect their own leadership, 
sometimes in hotly contested elections.  
Although the framework governing their activities remains 
corporatist, industry associations have increasingly found ways 
to get around such restrictions. For instance, in the shoe 
industry, there are at least five different associations –covering 
leather, shoe heels, shoe materials, etc.– registered at the 
municipal level, and there are at least five different provincial 
associations (tongxianghui) registered with the Wenzhou 
government. So associations are more plural and tend to cross 
administrative boundaries more than a corporatist model would 
lead one to expect. 
Moreover, Wenzhou merchants have also been terrifically 
successful in extending their organizations throughout China    
–and, indeed, the world–. There are now over 130 Wenzhou 
chambers of commerce –or industry associations– in different 
cities in China –known as yidi shanghui–. This pattern fits 
neither a corporatist model nor a Leninist model. Such 
associations represent all Wenzhou merchants in a particular 
area, not just one industry, and they are clearly organized 
horizontally, not in the nice, neat vertical lines favored by 
Leninist systems. What they resemble more than anything else 
is the guild associations of traditional China. 
Like the guilds of traditional China, these associations increase 
predictability in an uncertain world in which legal institutions 
remain poorly developed. Indeed, precisely because their 
standing in these various locales is largely dependent on 
informal relations, serving the interests of both the locale in 
question –by bring in investment– and the Wenzhou merchants 
–by providing channels to the local government and 
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information about investment opportunities for each other–, 
both the local government and the Wenzhou associations have a 
common interest in cultivating the mutual interests and 
understandings that allow each to prosper. And that often 
means denying opportunities to others –for instance, not 
allowing associations from other areas to register– and not 
promoting legal institutions –which would dilute the 
importance of informal relationships–. The result, then, is a 
thickening of the social relationships –that is, social capital– 
that make up minjian shehui but not the development of civil 
society. 
Institutionalization 
Institutionalization seems to be the buzz word in the China 
field, but there has been little attention to what type and how 
much institutionalization is taking place. In general, Chinese 
scholars in China are very cautious about their use of the term 
institutionalization, preferring instead the term “quasi-
institutionalization” (zhun zhiduhua). Obviously, by using the 
term “quasi-institutionalization” these scholars are suggesting 
that the processes that have taken place in China fall short of 
full institutionalization. This usage is rather in accordance with 
the way Western scholars discuss institutionalization, or at least 
formal institutionalization. Western scholars identify formal 
institutionalization in part by the presence of third-party 
enforcement. The existence or absence of third-party 
enforcement speaks volumes about the difference between civil 
society as it is known in the West and the development of 
social capital or minjian shehui as it has developed in China, 
either historically or in the present. Without third-party 
enforcement, including an independent judiciary and a legal 
framework to define state-society relations, one can only have 
quasi-institutionalization. 
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Although the term quasi-institutionalization is used in the 
Chinese literature, it is rarely defined. It is not easy to assert 
that the term quasi-institutionalism is appropriate or not; 
perhaps informal institutionalism would be better. But in any 
event, we are going to describe some of the relevant 
characteristics of quasi-institutionalism. 
First, because quasi-institutionalization lacks third-party 
enforcement, it is ultimately an informal arrangement based on 
an implicit understanding of the rules of the game –and such 
understandings can be manipulated–. Therefore, it is not 
binding. 
Second, the legitimacy of non-state institutions, such as 
associations, is not based on law or other understandings that 
exist independently of the state, but rather on the state itself.  
Although quasi-institutionalization suggests that the state 
cannot, except at high cost, abolish non-state institutions 
altogether, it can certainly restrict their activities and can 
interfere if individual leaders prove difficult. If an 
organization’s activities would be expanded to a broader, more 
political, goal, its legitimacy could be revoked by the state. The 
very uncertainty of the association’s status provides incentives 
not to challenge state authority. 
Third, the missions of institutions are narrow, and the state gets 
to define whether they are allowed to expand or not. 
Fourth, the weakness of associations encourages informal 
relationships between individual members –the better off 
members– and the state. 
Fifth, the very informality of quasi-institutions that provides 
benefits for both the state and the association suggests that both 
have an interest in preserving the informal status of the 
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relationship –and thus a common interest in preventing either 
the emergence of pluralism or the rule of law which implies the 
growth of third-party enforcement–. This means that one can 
have a rather vigorous growth of minjian shehui without the 
development of civil society. And that is what it happens in 
China today. As this historical review suggested, the 
institutional arrangements are quite consistent with what it was 
in the past. When the state is strong, the independence of 
associations is limited. It is difficult for such associations to 
constrain government in any meaningful sense. 
Finally, these characteristics suggest that quasi-institutio- 
nalization is not marking progress on the path to institutiona-
lization but rather a bulwark against institutionalization. It is sui 
generis, not a step on a path toward something else, and it is 
rather stable. 
Conclusion 
China today is very different than the traditional China with its 
network of guilds or late Qing society with the emergence of a 
public sphere. It is far more industrialized and urbanized, and 
the party-state is far stronger. The Chinese economy is now 
deeply imbedded in the global economy, and there has been an 
important growth of a middle class that may  –over time– 
significantly challenge patterns of governance. Yet the central 
state has been reluctant to yield its totalistic claims, the legal 
framework is neither independent nor genuinely constraining of 
political authority, and minjian shehui has grown up in ways 
that either accommodate or avoid the state. Rather than 
developing the pouvoirs intermediares that DeTocqueville saw 
as providing an essential buffer between state and society, 
China has continued to rely on the sort of informal relations 
that allow society to organize itself without delimiting the 
power of the state. The tenaciousness of these patterns of 
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organizing state-society relations over an extended period of 
time, through very different political regimes, is really quite 
striking. 
Do these patterns provide for good governance? Certainly they 
have not inhibited the growth of the economy, either in 
traditional or contemporary times, and it can be argued that 
China is as well governed –despite significant problems– as 
other countries at comparable levels of economic development. 
But there are trade-offs. The way state-society relations are 
organized reflects weak bureaucracy, with a diminished 
capacity for the sort of regulation that seems essential in the 
contemporary world, and a correspondingly weak legal order. It 
also reflects a rather decentralized socio-political order in 
which the local state reaches accommodations with local 
society, often at the expense of central authority. This has given 
Chinese society tremendous flexibility, as the growth of the 
“Wenzhou model” suggests, but it also suggests that the state-
building project, begun over a century ago, has a long ways to 
go. 
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